

Building Trust

An inter-communal analysis of Public Opinion in Cyprus

June 2006, Nicosia



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

Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot

Underlying Attitudes



Analysis-over-time



Note: Support for various types of co-existence (neighbourly, living under the other community’s local administration, inter-marriage, sharing political power) has slightly deteriorated among Greek Cypriots over the last year. Willingness to have Turkish Cypriot neighbours - an indicator which is considered the ‘litmus test’ for support or opposition to coexistence - remains at quite high levels, 62-63%. In contrast, political mistrust of Turkish Cypriots is also very high, again scoring 62-63%. Among Turkish Cypriots, there has been a decided shift against co-existence with Greek Cypriots, as measured by all key indicators. Depending on which indicator is used, the anti-coexistence shift ranges from 12 to 16 percent points over the last year.



Note: Compared to the Greek Cypriots, the identity shift of Turkish Cypriots has been much more dramatic over the last year. The ‘sense of commonality’ that Turkish Cypriots feel towards Greek Cypriots has fallen by about 13 percent points over just one year. Comparatively, the ‘sense of commonality’ Greek Cypriots feel towards Turkish Cypriots has fallen by about 5 percent points in the same period. The rise of religion among Turkish Cypriots (a 17 percent point increase) might be partly attributable to the recent appointment of 240 Imams who have come in from Turkey to operate mosques in various towns and villages. It should be emphasised that, while this trend of rising religiosity is indeed statistically related with rising anti-Greek Cypriot sentiment, there is no discernable statistical relationship between religiosity and support for politically motivated violence.





Note: Greek Cypriots are on the whole aware of their responsibilities regarding the Cyprus Problem, and are also willing to consider Turkish Cypriot concerns as well as their own in seeking to define a Comprehensive Settlement. Turkish Cypriots are somewhat less willing to ‘see the other side’s point of view’ though it should be noted that the decline in ‘willingness to compromise’ among Turkish Cypriots - about 6 percent points - is much less than the equivalent decline in ‘willingness to coexist’. Furthermore, militant and extremist tendencies have been declining among the Turkish Cypriots, probably a by-product of the Turkish Cypriot trend towards ‘greater Europeanization’.



Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot

Willingness to co-exist



In-depth Demographic Analysis





Note: Focusing on an in-depth demographic analysis of the ‘willingness to have neighbours of the other community’ indicator, which as mentioned earlier is a ‘litmus test’ of support or opposition to co-existence, we see, firstly, differentiations according to age group: The support of older Greek Cypriots (55+) for co-existence is very high, and in fact rising over time. The young are more ambivalent, though 50% of the 18-34 still favour co-existence with Turkish Cypriots. Among the Turkish Cypriots the picture is reversed, with the 55+ Turkish Cypriots being most opposed to co-existence. It should be noted here that among Turkish Cypriots, it is the middle age group (35 - 54) that has most dramatically been turning away from the prospect of coexistence with Greek Cypriots.





Note: In terms of political party support, we see that - among Greek Cypriots - AKEL supporters are most in favour of coexistence while DISY supporters are least in favour of coexistence, with DIKO and EDEK being in between. *(These results are based on the 2001 parliamentary elections, and do not take into account the shifts that have occurred as a result of the 2006 elections. Now, presumably, the profile of DISY voters will be closer to the norm of the other parties).* Certainly, we cannot talk about ‘anti-Turkish Cypriot parties’ in the Greek Cypriot community, since the majority of all parties’ supporters are in favour of coexistence. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot parties are largely defined around the issue of support or opposition to coexistence with Greek Cypriots. BDH and CTP supporters tend to be ‘pro-Greek Cypriot’ while DP and UBP supporters tend to be ‘anti-Greek Cypriot’. A corollary of this finding is that an anti-Greek Cypriot shift in Turkish Cypriot society will ultimately translate into stronger political support for DP and UBP.





Note: In both communities, women tend to be less in favour of coexistence than men. Among Greek Cypriots, about 68% of men are in favour of coexistence, but only 58% of women. Among Turkish Cypriots, the gap used to be 6 percent points (57% for men, 51% for women), though the gap has been narrowing in recent months. Combined with the earlier findings regarding how age is a factor in support for coexistence, we can say that it is Turkish Cypriot men in the 35 to 54 age bracket that have most dramatically turned away from the prospect of co-existence with Greek Cypriots. Given that this is the most ‘politically active’ demographic group, we can reasonably assume that this anti-Greek Cypriot shift is strongly related to the political ‘trench warfare’ that the two sides have been engaged in (disputes regarding trade and flights, the issue of properties, the lack of visible progress in restarting Comprehensive Settlement negotiations etc.)



Note: In terms of education, we see that among Greek Cypriots the less educated are more strongly in favour of coexistence, while among Turkish Cypriots it is the more educated that are in favour of coexistence. The Greek Cypriot result may be attributable to the close ties which have always existed between the working classes of the two communities. To explain the Turkish Cypriot result, one might argue that the more educated Turkish Cypriots, who tend to seek the modernisation and Europeanization of their community, see the closer integration with Greek Cypriots as an integral aspect of this social transformation.



Note: In terms of their vote at the April 2004 referendum, it is evident that those who voted ‘Yes’ are more likely to now turn away from the prospect of co-existence. This, probably, can be attributed as a psychological dynamic of disappointment. Very significantly, it should be noted that 62% of Greek Cypriots who voted ‘No’ are in favour of co-existence with Turkish Cypriots. In this sense, the ‘No’ vote of Greek Cypriots was not a ‘No’ to co-existence per se. In contrast, among Turkish Cypriots who voted ‘No’, support for co-existence only clocks in 29% to 34%. Thus, it can be argued that the Turkish Cypriot widespread sentiment that “Greek Cypriots, in voting ‘No’ rejected co-existence with us” is a case of ‘evaluating the other based on one’s own cognitive map’: Turkish Cypriot ‘No’ voters were genuinely opposed to co-existence, and therefore Turkish Cypriots assume that the Greek Cypriot ‘No’ voters - the mentality of whom Turkish Cypriots do not really understand - are also opposed to co-existence. This misunderstanding is an important aspect of the current deadlock.




Note: On the issue of refugee status, we can see that in both communities it is the refugees (of both sides) who have been turning away from coexistence - especially so among Turkish Cypriots. This is probably related to the dispute over properties, which directly affects most refugees of both communities. Greek Cypriot refugees are angry that Turkish Cypriots are trying to exploit their properties, while Turkish Cypriot refugees are angry that Greek Cypriots are filing legal cases against them. Among Turkish Cypriots, there is a widespread sentiment that “Greek Cypriots only want to get their properties back, but don’t care about us personally”. This finding should be seen as a call for the two leaderships to somehow find a way to regulate the issue of properties in the interim, before it poisons further the relations between the two communities.

Views on preferred Type of Solution


Comparative GC/TC Analysis

Greek Cypriot "Solution Type" preferences



Note: For many Greek Cypriots at the moment, the distinction between a Federal Solution and a Two State Solution is unclear. Since the rejection of the Annan Plan, there is a tendency among Greek Cypriots to view Federation as “nothing more than Partition in disguise”, and hence the similarity in scores between ‘Federal Solution’ and ‘Two State Solution’. While Greek Cypriots view a potential ‘Unitary State Solution’ as the undisputed ideal (there is nothing new in this), they also readily acknowledge, in their majority, that such a solution would be unrealistic to aim for. Thus, while Greek Cypriots favour re-unification in general and as an abstract concept, they are also at a loss to point out what exactly it is that they would like to see happening at the moment, in the sense of agreeing to a specific settlement Plan. Arguably, the Greek Cypriot community would now do well to focus on clarifying to themselves what exactly Federation implies, how this is different from ‘Two States’, and whether such a Federal arrangement would or could be made to satisfy their basic prerequisites for a Comprehensive Settlement.


Turkish Cypriot "Solution Type" preferences




Note: Despite the negative mood of Turkish Cypriots towards Greek Cypriots at the moment, support for a Federal Solution remains at reasonably high levels. Thus, one may conclude that for the Turkish Cypriots pursuing Federation is a strategic choice, not to be swept away lightly or without thought. The strong rejection by Turkish Cypriots of a possible ‘Two State Solution’, as well as their also strong rejection of a ‘Unitary State’, should be noted at this point: For a majority of Turkish Cypriots, Federation is seen as “a healthy mixture of autonomy and integration”, and in this balance lies its attraction over the two other “extreme types of solution” which have both been losing ground over recent years.

Views on potential Confidence Building Measures,
to be unilaterally instituted by the Greek Cypriots

Comparative GC/TC Analysis




A Turkish Cypriot school to operate in Limassol, for the children of Turkish Cypriots living there




A Turkish Cypriot school to operate in Limassol, for the children of Turkish Cypriots who live there.

Note: Opening a Turkish Cypriot school in Limassol is an obvious unilateral step that the Greek Cypriot side could do, which would be greatly appreciated by the Turkish Cypriots as well. The Greek Cypriot leadership argues that there is no demand for a Turkish Cypriot school, insofar as the Turkish Cypriots who live in Limassol themselves claim to prefer sending their children to an integrated ‘multi-cultural school’. Having said that, perhaps the existence of a Turkish Cypriot school in Limassol might encourage other Turkish Cypriots to make a home in Limassol as well, people who might now be hesitant due to the lack of appropriate education services. What is most important, is that if the Greek Cypriots choose to allow for a Turkish Cypriot school to be opened in Limassol, it may be received as a signal of willingness to respect Turkish Cypriot communal rights (as opposed to mere ‘individual rights’), thus helping to decrease some of the Turkish Cypriot insecurities that are now standing in the way of progress at the negotiating table.




The Republic of Cyprus, in co-operation with the European Union, to facilitate the development of viable industries in the north that do not involve the use of GC properties




The Republic of Cyprus, in co-operation with the European Union, to facilitate the development of viable industries in the north that do not involve the use of Greek Cypriot properties.

Note: The Turkish Cypriots are frequently complaining that granting them Direct Trade would not in itself be very helpful, since they would have very few goods to actually export to the European Union. Even so, the fact remains that Turkish Cypriot wages are much lower than the EU average, while level of education is quite high. Combined with the possibility of exporting to the EU at preferential rates through a 'Direct Trade' deal, one can easily see how this situation lends itself to the development of a highly competitive Turkish Cypriot manufacturing industry. The jobs that would be created under such a scenario would not only assist in the process of economic convergence with the Greek Cypriots and the EU; what is more important is that while creating such industry, the need of Turkish Cypriots to build and sell holiday homes on Greek Cypriot properties would be correspondingly reduced. Though a minority of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would oppose such a proposal, there is clearly sufficient support to proceed with such a scenario, if the political will of the two leaderships is there.




Hotels in the north that are legally built and owned by Turkish Cypriots to be promoted internationally through the Republic of Cyprus - operated Cyprus tourism Organisation




Hotels in the north that are legally built and owned by Turkish Cypriots, to be promoted internationally through the Cyprus Tourism Organisation of the Republic of Cyprus.

Note: Supporting the Turkish Cypriot tourism industry is clearly not something that the Greek Cypriot public is willing to condone at the moment. It should be noted however that this scenario would be quite popular with a strong majority of Turkish Cypriots. Perhaps this measure could be instituted as part of a 'package deal', in which the Greek Cypriots also get something in return (*perhaps a partial embargo on construction over Greek Cypriot properties?*), rather than as a unilateral gesture of good will.




All Turkish Cypriot properties in the south that are not being used by anyone right now, to be immediately and unconditionally returned to their owners




Any Turkish Cypriot properties in the south that are not currently being used by anyone else to be unconditionally returned to its owners.

Note: Unilaterally returning Turkish Cypriot properties that are not currently being used, if seen as a one-sided measure, is not something that the Greek Cypriot public would condone (they might be willing to consider it if done bilaterally). Having said that, even among the Turkish Cypriots themselves, who would be the beneficiaries of such an initiative, there is strong doubt as to whether this is advisable or not. These doubts most probably stem from a fear that such extensive property return now, might undermine the very principle of bizonality in a future Comprehensive Settlement.





The airport of Ercan to operate under EU management, after authorisation from the government of the Republic of Cyprus, so that Turkish Cypriots can travel directly to the EU and receive visitors from the EU



The airport of Ercan to operate under European Union management, after the authorisation of the Republic of Cyprus, so that Turkish Cypriots can travel directly to the European Union and receive visitors from the European Union.


Note: Even within a ‘palatable’ legal framework, Greek Cypriots would strongly oppose the unilateral opening of Ercan Airport (again, they might be more willing to consider it as part of a wider bilateral agreement). A plurality of Turkish Cypriots would be favourably inclined toward such an initiative, though there would be a vocal minority opposing it, presumably on the grounds that the legal basis for the opening of the airport (European Union management, Republic of Cyprus authorisation) would be unacceptable. And yet, realistically speaking, this is probably the only feasible framework within which a deal over the issue of Ercan Airport might be struck. If not this, then the whole matter may end up being put to one side, to be eventually dealt with as part of a Comprehensive Settlement.




Note: Overall, the range of possible unilateral Greek Cypriot initiatives in favour of Turkish Cypriots is quite limited. One option that would be popular in both sides, would be to open a Turkish Cypriot school in Limassol. A second option, which would perhaps be less popular but not fatally so, is for the Greek Cypriots to facilitate the development of viable industries in the north. This proposal should be considered not on the basis of its face popularity, but because it would help to remove some of the structural distortions in the Turkish Cypriot economy. Other proposals, related to the return of Turkish Cypriot properties in the south, the opening of Ercan Airport and the support of the Turkish Cypriot tourism industry, are too sensitive to be considered unilaterally - only in an appropriately balanced package might such issues be dealt with in a mutually acceptable manner.

Views on potential Confidence Building Measures,
to be unilaterally instituted by the Turkish Cypriots

Comparative GC/TC Analysis




Travel across the Green Line to be with presentation of ID only, without the requirement to fill in Visas and other such documents.




Travel across the Green Line to be with the presentation of ID only, without the requirement to fill in Visas and other such documents

Note: The Turkish Cypriot public is quite willing to accept the waiving of the so called ‘visa requirement’ when crossing from the south into the north. While this would be welcomed by a majority of Greek Cypriots, there would still be a vocal minority that would oppose the measure, mostly on the grounds that ‘such a measure would just encourage people to visit the north, and in strengthening their economy this would gradually grant the Turkish Cypriots more status’. Having said that, and looking beyond the insecurities of this minority group, such a measure might be an essential undergirding of any CBM package that seeks to increase contact between members of the two communities, since the requirement to fill in a so called ‘Visa’ is currently acting as a strong inhibitor of inter-communal contact.




All construction on Greek Cypriot properties in the north to cease immediately.




All construction on Greek Cypriot properties in the north to cease immediately

Note: The ceasing of any further construction over refugee-owned properties in the north is clearly a very strong demand of the Greek Cypriot public. If seen as a unilateral Turkish Cypriot initiative, however, then a majority of Turkish Cypriots would oppose it. The reasoning of Turkish Cypriots is that under the current circumstances, construction over Greek Cypriot properties is one of their few outlets for economic growth. Thus, any CBM package that attempts to include a moratorium on further construction over Greek Cypriot properties, should at the same time provide other compensatory outlets for Turkish Cypriot investment and economic growth.





A scheme for the voluntary repatriation of Turkish immigrants to begin immediately, wherein they will be offered a home and a job at their place of origin in Turkey, if they accept to depart from Cyprus.





A scheme for the repatriation of Turkish immigrants to begin immediately, wherein they will be offered a home and a job at their place of origin in Turkey, if they accept to depart from Cyprus

Note: A scheme for the voluntary repatriation of settlers from Turkey, even before a Comprehensive Settlement is agreed, would be welcomed by Greek Cypriots but opposed by a plurality of Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot community has been gradually integrating the settlers from Turkey, and thus they now resist any proposal that tends to imply that these individuals should return to Turkey. And yet, the Greek Cypriots feel deeply uneasy about the presence of a large number of non-Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot electorate. *(In this as well as in other surveys, settlers from Turkey form about 25% of the sample, and therefore we can assume that they form one quarter of the overall electorate in the north)*





Note: Greek Cypriots feel strongly offended by the presence of Turkish flags in historical monuments in the north that are clearly part of their own cultural heritage - such as Orthodox monasteries, Greek archaeological sites like Salamis, etc. And yet, the Turkish Cypriot public strongly reacts to the possibility of removing Turkish flags from such monuments. In-depth qualitative analysis reveals that this opposition is not so much due to personal conviction, as it is a product of fear that “if Turkish flags are removed from archaeological sites, then the extremists will react very strongly and this could be very dangerous”




Note: Overall, we can see that there are very few “gestures of good will” that the Turkish Cypriots could do unilaterally, that would be simultaneously tolerated by their own public and seen as a positive step by the Greek Cypriot public. One helpful and acceptable measure would be if the so called ‘Visa requirement’ when crossing the checkpoint is waived, since this would increase contact between the two communities and would also increase Greek Cypriot spending in the north, thus boosting the Turkish Cypriot economy further. Given that the Turkish Cypriots are consistently making it clear that they are not seeking the recognition of the ‘TRNC’, there should not be any serious obstacles to waiving the ‘TRNC Visa’ requirement. The other urgent issue - construction over Greek Cypriot properties - should also somehow be dealt with, since it is poisoning the relations of the two communities on a daily basis. Having said that, the issue is too sensitive to be seen as a possible unilateral step - this can only be resolved as part of a package in which the Turkish Cypriots gain alternative outlets for economic growth.

Views on potential Confidence Building Measures,
to be agreed by the two sides


Comparative GC/TC Analysis



Note: A very promising and mutually acceptable measure, would be if the two leaderships agree to include the language of the other community in their road signs. Currently, road signs in the north are in Turkish and English, while road signs in the south are in Greek and English. If all three languages are included on all signs all over Cyprus, this would not only be practically helpful but it would also carry a strong message of cultural tolerance and openness, helping in a subtle way to build a pro-unification momentum.




To operate from now a common commission of GC and TC scientists that will attempt to establish a common history for the events of the Cyprus Problem over the past 50 years




A common committee of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot scientists to begin functioning immediately, with the purpose of defining a common history of the events of the Cyprus Problem over the last 50 years.

Note: Another mutually acceptable step might be to establish an inter-communal commission of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot historians, with the specific aim of establishing a common and integrated view of the history of the Cyprus Problem. Now that the Missing Persons effort is bearing fruit, with the remains of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot missing persons finally being discovered and identified, it is perhaps the right time to initiate a dialogue about the events that have brought hardship on all Cypriots decades ago. This commission could also have a secondary aim of examining how the media in conjunction with politicians in Cyprus are perpetuating conflict-oriented mentalities, and advise the two sides accordingly.




Young people from both communities to participate in a "Youth Constitutional Convention", that will seek to find alternative solutions to aspects of the Cyprus Problem and deliver its findings to the political leadership




Young people from both sides of the divide to be invited to participate in a "Youth Constitutional Convention", that will seek to find alternative solutions to aspects of the Cyprus Problem and advise the two leaders accordingly.

Note: It is a well known fact that the youth in Cyprus, of both communities, are seeing the Cyprus Problem in radically different ways than their elders. The Turkish Cypriot youth tend to be more enthusiastic about a settlement than their parents, seeing opportunities for the future where their parents see fears from the past, while the Greek Cypriot youth are less enthusiastic about a settlement than their parents, insofar as the future is 'already open to them' while they do not experience their parents' nostalgia about lost villages and properties. An Inter-Communal Youth Convention should not attempt to examine the classical aspects of the "Cyprus Problem" (Property, Security, Settlers, Power Sharing etc.), but rather it should focus on examining the "Cyprus Opportunity": What role a reunited Cyprus could play in the international community, how a multi-cultural Cyprus could personally enrich all its citizens, and so on.




The Turkish army withdraws half of its forces from Cyprus and the GC national guard reduces its period of obligatory military service from two to one year




The Turkish Army to withdraw half of its forces from Cyprus, and similarly the Greek Cypriot National Guard to reduce its period of obligatory military service from two years to one year, thus effectively reducing its strength by half.

Note: Partial demilitarization before a Comprehensive Settlement is a definite ‘no-no’ among the Turkish Cypriots, and there would also be many among the Greek Cypriots that would feel very insecure about such an arrangement. Perhaps the issue could be brought up again at a later stage, if confidence between the two sides reaches a higher level, or alternatively the whole issue could be left to be dealt with as part of a Comprehensive Settlement.





Nicosia-within-the-walls to be fully demilitarised and what is now the dead zone in that region to be developed under UN supervision for projects that will benefit both communities




Nicosia-within-the-walls to be fully demilitarised and what is now the dead zone in that region to be developed under United Nations supervision for projects that will benefit both communities.


Note: Turning the “dead zone” in Nicosia into a “living zone”, where members of both communities can freely interact without needing to cross over to the other side, and where projects for the benefit of both communities can be housed, would be particularly popular among the Greek Cypriots. In-depth qualitative analysis reveals that the Turkish Cypriots would also find such a proposal acceptable, but the mere thought of “demilitarization” was sufficient to provoke an instinctive anxiety response in survey participants. If this proposal is re-worked in such a way as to make it clear that the troops of both sides would, in essence, only be asked to pull back a few dozen meters to make space for this “living zone”, then there will probably be no objections whatsoever from the Turkish Cypriots.



Note: The return of religious sites to the respective control of their communities would be a mutually acceptable gesture of good will, that would promote the principles of multi-culturalism and social tolerance. While almost all Greek Cypriots and a majority of Turkish Cypriots would approve of such a scheme, the concerns of the minority of Turkish Cypriots that would oppose such a development should also be examined and understood, so that the proposal is implemented in a careful and peaceful manner. It should be noted that this proposal would lose much of its value if it is not linked with a waiving of ‘Visa requirements’ for crossing into the north, since many Greek Cypriots would still feel that they cannot really make use of these new privileges. If returning all churches and mosques proves practically difficult, then a selection of establishments could be put on a priority list to be returned to their owners as soon as possible.





Refugee-owned land and property, whether of GC in the north or TC in the south, that is not currently being used by anyone, to be unconditionally returned to its owners




Any refugee-owned land and property, whether of Greek Cypriots in the north or of Turkish Cypriots in the south, that is not currently being used by anyone else to be unconditionally returned to its owners.


Note: While a ‘partial resolution’ of the property dispute now, before a Comprehensive Settlement, would be supported by a majority of Greek Cypriots, a plurality of Turkish Cypriots would oppose it. Like in the case of the Security issue, the Turkish Cypriots prefer that there should be a limit in the number of issues that are discussed in the context of CBMs - and that such sensitive issues should only be dealt with as part of a Comprehensive Settlement. Greek Cypriots, in contrast, seem quite willing to “start solving the Cyprus Problem now, little by little”.



Note: The well known ‘Varosha for Famagusta Port’ trade-off, elicits similar response patterns among both communities: Some are in favour, some are against, some are ambivalent. Though the Turkish Cypriots appear somewhat more opposed to this than the Greek Cypriots, once the effect of political influence is discounted (*The Turkish Cypriot leadership officially rejects the deal, while the Greek Cypriot leadership officially accepts it*), it is likely that what we get are almost identical response patterns from both sides. Such a proposal could perhaps be linked with other elements (e.g. the issue of construction over Greek Cypriot properties, support for Turkish Cypriot industry) to create a package which will amount to a viable economic development plan for the Turkish Cypriot community.




All use of GC hotels and all construction on GC land in the north to cease. In parallel, following the approval of the Republic of Cyprus, Ercan airport operates under EU mgnt so that TC can directly travel to the EU and accept visitors from the EU




The airport of Ercan to operate under EU management, after RoC authorisation, so that TCs can travel directly to the EU and receive visitors from the EU, while at the same time all construction on Greek Cypriot properties and all use of Greek Cypriot hotels in the north to cease

Note: An even more daring ‘package proposal’ would be to link the issue of direct flights from Ercan, with a moratorium on construction over Greek Cypriot properties and a ceasing of unauthorised use of Greek Cypriot hotels in the north. In other words, the Greek Cypriots would concede direct flights to the north with the understanding that this will not lead to increased exploitation of their own properties. It is known that the Turkish Cypriots have recently switched to a policy where they build new hotels on Turkish Cypriot rather than Greek Cypriot land, and therefore such a deal would not necessarily be unthinkable. Opposition to such an agreement would be quite high in both communities (40% of Greek Cypriots opposed, 45% of Turkish Cypriots opposed) therefore moving such a deal forward would require strong political will and an appropriate communication strategy by all sides involved.




Note: Greek Cypriots are on the whole open to any interim agreement that will restore confidence between the two sides, or even begin to solve some of the more sensitive aspects of the Cyprus Problem such as Security and Property. Even so, possible deals that have to do with ‘the ending of Turkish Cypriot isolation’ are met with some ambivalence, due to a widespread fear that ‘if isolations are lifted then the Turkish Cypriots will no longer be interested in re-unification’.




Note: The Turkish Cypriots are quite open to proposals that will promote social reconciliation between the people of the two communities on a personal level, leading to greater mutual respect, a transcendence of fears from the past, and the development of a common vision for the future. Having said that, Turkish Cypriots are hesitant over the prospect of ‘trying to solve the Cyprus Problem piece by piece’, are ambivalent about making concessions in return for ‘the ending of isolation’ and definitely oppose any notion of demilitarization outside the framework of a Comprehensive Settlement.

Views on preferred procedure to re-start negotiations

Comparative GC/TC Analysis




Begin with the Annan Plan, have each side declare its concerns and objections and then have a give-and-take process where each side can hope to have its top priorities satisfied, in return for satisfying the top priorities of the other side




We begin with the Annan Plan, each side declares its concerns and objections, and then a “give-and-take” takes place, where each side can hope to have its top priority concerns satisfied, in return for satisfying the top priority concerns of the other side

Note: One possible process for re-starting negotiations is to follow the approach that was utilized in making the shift from “Annan One” to “Annan Three”, and then again from “Annan Three” to “Annan Five”: A classical “give-and-take”, that begins with the latest Annan Plan as the basis of negotiations and then adopts a trading paradigm, seeing possible amendments to the Plan as “goods” to be “bartered” between the two sides. Implicit in this methodology is the adoption of a “win-lose” philosophy, wherein the benefit of one side is by definition detrimental to the interests of the other side, and therefore needs to be “paid for” with a “costly amendment” in favour of the other. In evaluating this approach, it is interesting to note that large majorities of both communities - about 60% in fact - predict that it is likely or even certain to lead negotiations to a dead end. In panels that were conducted parallel to the survey, respondents made the following comments: “this approach has already been tried and it doesn’t work”, “such an approach will not lead to a plan that is more acceptable to us (Greek Cypriots) than the Annan Plan was”, “the leaders will never agree in this manner”, “we will have to make unacceptable concessions” and so on.




Set up a constitutional convention where each side elects its own representatives making a total of 100 representatives, who then work together in small groups and as a whole assembly to negotiate solutions to the various aspects of the Cyprus problem




A constitutional convention is set up where each side elects its own representatives, making a total of 100 representatives, who then work together in small groups and as a whole assembly to negotiate solutions to the various aspects of the Cyprus Problem

Note: A radical alternative might be to adopt a “Constitutional Convention” model to Comprehensive Settlement negotiations, taking the process away from the two leaders and into the hands of an assembly that will be elected for this purpose. Among both communities, this proposal is seen as somewhat more hopeful than adopting the classical “bartering type” of negotiations. Having said that, strong reservations remain: In panel discussions, respondents expressed concern that the process might become overly politicized, that the media would interfere, that the assembly members would just talk and talk but never agree. A mitigating feature of the proposal was seen to be the fact that the assembly members would also be working together in small groups - not just as a whole assembly - and this “small group” component was perceived to be a hopeful aspect.




Begin by identifying specific issues both sides disagree on, appoint expert committees to suggest possible solutions and finally have the leaders meet and consider the available options and choose one both agree on




Begin by identifying specific issues both sides disagree on, then for these issues expert committees are appointed to suggest different possible solutions. Finally, the leaders meet to consider from among these options and choose those they both agree on

Note: The most favoured option, by both communities, seems to be a “three-stage process” as follows: Firstly, a screening of the various aspects of the Cyprus Problem is made to determine which precisely are the issues that the two sides disagree on. Following that, and depending on which precise issues are brought forward, inter-communal committees of (mostly Cypriot) experts are appointed to explore aspects of the disagreement and develop, as a group, various possible bridging proposals. Finally, these proposals are brought to the leaders whose responsibility it is to rank-order them, and select, from among the various options, those on which they can both agree. What is it that made this proposal most favored among both communities? With the conservative and constricted process of a classical “give-and-take” at the one extreme, and with an unruly and potentially chaotic Constitutional Convention at the other extreme, many of the respondents may have felt that the “three-stage” proposal described above would be a more moderate and balanced approach. It is important to emphasize that, through such an approach, the process of generating options would be separated from the process of evaluating options, and through this separation of responsibilities creativity would to some extent be unblocked. Furthermore, the generation of options would be developed inter-communally, as opposed to emanating from one of the two sides or from third parties, and therefore these options will inherently be more balanced and better received by both leaders, than any which “the other side” - or an “outsider” - might unilaterally generate. In the panels, one concern of the respondents was that a committee of experts might not adequately represent their concerns; in this sense, the process was seen to be not political enough. One way to address this concern might be to also add in ‘representative committees’ that would work in tandem to the expert committees. These additional committees should include representatives of various social groups that might otherwise be excluded from the political process, such as young people, women, the less well-off, and representatives of religion.





We don't do anything at present. We wait until the political situation matures to a point where we are in a position to achieve a better solution



No action is taken at present. We wait until the political situation matures to a point where we are in a position to achieve a better solution

Note: Among both communities, the “do nothing” approach is clearly the least favoured option. It is true that in both communities minorities exist that believe time to be “on their side” - for instance Greek Cypriots who hope that “with time Turkey might be under greater pressure to make a deal”, or Turkish Cypriots who feel that “if time is given for the isolations to be first lifted then we will be in a stronger bargaining position”. Strong majorities of both sides, however, sense that the passage of time is merely complicating the issue, leading the two communities further apart from each other but also damaging each community separately. For Greek Cypriots, the current situation is unacceptable insofar as the Turkish Army remains, Greek Cypriot properties in the north are being built over and the influx of Settlers from Turkey continues unabated, while for Turkish Cypriots the current situation is unacceptable insofar as they remain legally unrecognized in the “no-man’s land” between Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union, in a bizarre state of semi-isolation from the outside world. Thus, the mandate of both communities towards their leaders, for different though equally strong reasons, is to resume negotiations the soonest in such a manner as will lead to a satisfactory Comprehensive Settlement agreement before the situation is allowed to deteriorate any further.



Note: It is a very hopeful sign that, in evaluating the various possible processes for re-starting Comprehensive Settlement negotiations, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots totally agree in the way that they rank the offered possibilities. For both communities, the absolutely worst strategy is to simply 'do nothing'. Similarly, a process of classical give-and-take negotiations on the top political level is seen to be almost as hopeless, since this is what has been pursued without success for decades now. Both sides would prefer a more representative process that would include more than just 'the two leaders', a creative process that would generate alternative options and solutions for the various aspects of the problem rather than a constricted process that would merely regurgitate the 'classical negotiating positions' of the two sides.

Poll Identity

Method of data collection: Face-to-face interview with structured questionnaire

Period of Data Collection: 10th - 25th April 2006

Sampling Method: Multi-stage random stratified sampling

Sample Size: 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots

Project co-ordination and data analysis: Alexandros Lordos, adlordos@otenet.gr

Field-work responsibility: CYMAR Market Research Ltd

KADEM Cyprus Social Research

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